A multiclass queue with many servers is considered, where customers make a join-or-leave decision upon arrival based on queue length information, without knowing the state of other queues. A game theoretic formulation is proposed and analyzed, that takes advantage of a phenomenon unique to heavy traffic regimes, namely, Reiman's snaphshot principle, by which waiting times are predicted with high precision by the information available upon arrival. The payoff considered is given as a random variable, which depends on the customer's decision, accounting for waiting time in the queue and penalty for leaving. The notion of an equilibrium is only meaningful in an asymptotic framework, which is taken here to be the Halfin-Whitt heavy traffic regime. The main result is the identification of an -Nash equilibrium with probability approaching 1. On the way to proving this result, new diffusion limit results for systems with finite buffers are obtained.
1. Introduction. Equilibrium behavior of strategic customers in queueing systems has been the subject of great interest since the work of Naor [16] (see the book by Hassin and Haviv [13] for a survey), and has been a particularly active research area in recent years. As far as heavy traffic analysis is concerned, not a great deal of attention has been drawn to game theoretic aspects such as the asymptotic study of Nash equilibria, unlike, for example, control theoretic treatment, to which much work has been devoted. In this paper we propose and analyse a game theoretic formulation of strategic customers in a multiclass queueing system that takes advantage of phenomena specific to heavy traffic regimes. The formulation is based on associating with each customer a payoff that reflects the customer's actual waiting time rather than its expectation. The notion of equilibrium addressed, namely, an -Nash equilibrium with high probability (w.h.p.), becomes meaningful only as scaling limits are taken. An additional aspect that is unique to this setting regards the relatively small level of information required for the players. In game theoretic analysis of queueing models, it is usually the case that when partial information of the system's state is available to the player, the unobservable states are assumed to be in stationarity. In the setting of this paper, customers are aware of the queue length of their own class (as well as the system parameters, specifically the rate of arrival, or at least a first order approximation thereof) but not those of other classes. However, stationarity assumptions are not required. Moreover, while this paper assumes that the system operates under a scheduling policy of one out of two specific types (see below), it should be noted that the scheduling policy is not known to the customers when they make their decisions.
Motivating applications include the following. Consider a call center where customers call to get various kinds of services Aksin et al. [1] . There are several classes of customers associated with service requirements of different types. Customers that call are notified how many customers of their class are waiting in line, and naturally, they are not aware of the scheduling policy. They then decide whether to stay in line or leave based on this piece of information. Another motivation comes from on-demand usage of resources in cloud computing. The cloud service provider offers computational resources to different classes of customers, at possibly different rates. Delay is often a significant factor taken into account side by side with the cost of usage, and usage decisions are made by the customers based on this information. For more on the latter application see Atar et al. [6] and references therein; this application has also been the main motivation for a control problem formulation in heavy traffic in Atar and Shifrin [5] .
The model considered consists of a fixed number of customer classes, that differ in their service rates, and n identical, exponential servers that work in parallel. Upon arrival of a class-i customer, the ith queue length is revealed and, based on this information, he decides whether to join or leave. Accordingly, the customer's payoff is given by h i WT or r i , respectively, where h i + → + is a given function, WT is the time the particular customer 3 behaviour of customers in a transportation station. In both cases, Nash equilibria are determined under various assumptions on the level of information.
We use the following notation. For a b ∈ , the maximum (resp., minimum) is denoted by a∨b (resp., a∧b), and a + = a ∨ 0, a − = −a ∨ 0. For x y ∈ k (k a positive integer), x · y and x denote the usual scalar product and 2 norm, respectively. Write e i , i = 1 k for the standard basis in k and 1 for k i=1 e i . Denote + = 0 . For f + → k , f T = sup t∈ 0 T f t , and, for > 0,
For a Polish space , let 0 T and 0 T denote the set of continuous and, respectively, càdlàg functions 0 T → . Write and for the case where 0 T is replaced by + . Endow with the Skorohod J 1 topology. Write X n ⇒ X for convergence in distribution. A sequence of processes X n with sample paths in is said to be C-tight if it is tight and every subsequential limit has, with probability 1, sample paths in . For a sequence of processes n , n ∈ , with sample paths in k , C-tightness is characterized (see Jacod and Shiryaev [14, VI.3.26] ) by the following:
C1. The sequence of random variables n T is tight for every fixed T < . C2. For every T < , > 0, and > 0 there exist n 0 and > 0 such that
For a positive integer k, m ∈ k and a symmetric, positive matrix A ∈ k×k , an m A -Brownian motion (BM) is a k-dimensional BM starting from zero, having drift m and infinitesimal covariance matrix A.
This paper is organized as follows. The model and the equilibrium result appear in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the behavior of the system under FP and SLQ, respectively, and along the way also obtain diffusion limit results, that may be interesting by their own right. Section 5 addresses RSP in these two settings and proves the main result.
2. Model and main result. We start by introducing the probabilistic model and the HW scaling. Then we provide the game theoretic setting and state the main result.
A sequence of queueing models is considered, indexed by n ∈ . The nth system has N buffers and n identical servers. Customers from N distinct classes arrive at the system and, upon arrival, each customer is informed about the queue length at the buffer that corresponds to its own customer class, and, based on this information only, makes a decision whether to join or leave the system. If a customer of class i decides to join, he goes directly for service on the event that any of the servers is available, and otherwise he is queued in buffer i. As far as the service policy is concerned, we consider FP and SLQ (that is, however, unknown to the customers). In the first case, the servers serve according to the rule given by 1 > 2 > · · · > N . Thus, when a server becomes available, it admits into service a customer in the buffer with highest priority (that is, least index) among all buffers that are nonempty at that instant. Under SLQ, the buffer that currently has the most customers receives highest priority (where ties are broken arbitrarily). At each buffer, the customers are always taken from the head of the line. We assume the nonidling condition, that is, that no server will idle as long as any customers are in the queue.
Let be a probability space, on which all the random variables (r.v.s) introduced below are to be defined. The arrivals in each class occur according to independent renewal processes. Let parameters
N , be given, representing the mean interarrival times of class-i customers in the nth system. Let IA i l l ∈ i be independent sequences of strictly positive i.i.d. r.v.s with mean 1 and variance C 2 IA i
. Let
Then E n i counts the number of class-i arrivals up to time t. The parameters n i satisfy
where i > 0 andˆ i ∈ are fixed. The service times of class-i customers are assumed to be exponential with mean i . The potential service processes, denoted by S i i=1 2 N , are thus assumed to comprise a collection of N mutually independent Poisson process, with rates i , i = 1 2 N , respectively. They are assumed to have right-continuous sample paths. While the arrival rates are accelerated with n, the individual service rates are not. However, the capacity of the service pool grows due to the increase of the number of servers, n. traffic intensity is thus asymptotically given by i i , where i = i / i . We will assume the following critical load condition:
The initial conditions,
v.s representing the number of customers initially in the buffers and in service, respectively. It is assumed that the initial configuration satisfies 1 · Q n 0 > 0 implies 1 · n 0 = n, reflecting the nonidling condition.
For each n, the three objects
are assumed to be mutually independent. The triplet (4) will be referred to as the stochastic primitives of the model. All r.v.s introduced below, describing the system dynamics, will be given as functions of the stochastic primitives and of the collection of decisions taken by the strategic customers. Thus, before describing the system dynamics, we introduce the notation for the decision variables. The customers initially in the system do not participate in the game formulation, and therefore in what follows, unless otherwise stated, the term customer will refer to those customers that arrive after time zero. A customer will be identified by a pair i j , where i ∈ 1 2 N is its class, and j ∈ is its serial number in order of arrival. The collection of decision variables = ij i ∈ 1 2 N j ∈ , where ij ∈ 0 1 , specifies the decision of each of the customers. Having ij = 1 (resp., 0) specifies that the jth class-i customer to arrive decides to join (resp., leave) the system. Let
denote counting processes for joining and reneging customers. Let Q n i t be the number of class-i customers waiting at the ith buffer at time t, and let B 
where the departure process D n i counts the number of completed services of class-i jobs since time 0 (including initial customers). It is assumed that the departure process is given, in terms of the potential service process, by
The nonidling condition is expressed by requiring
Under the FP policy we have
And under SLQ, a server that becomes available at time t chooses class i 0 , where i 0 ∈ arg max i Q n i (where ties are broken in an arbitrary, but concrete way), namely,
The collection of Equations (5)- (9) and either (10) or (11), along with the primitives and the decision variables , uniquely define the processes Q n , X n , n , B n , and D n under each of the two policies. Note that these processes are right-continuous by construction. 
Note that, as a consequence,
(JT, RT, WT, as well as AT defined below, are mnemonics for joining time, routing time, waiting time, and arrival time.) We shall also need notation of arrival time and waiting time of the jth class-i customer. These are obtained as follows:
Note that while WT n ij is well defined for all i j , it only gives the waiting time for those customers i j that have actually joined the system; this concept is indeed meaningless for the reneging customers. Scaled versions of the main stochastic processes introduced above are defined as follows:
It is assumed that the scaled initial condition converges in distribution:
where 0 is an N -valued r.v. with i i 0 ≤ 0. This completes the description of the stochastic processes of interest. We denote the collection of processes, that we will sometimes refer to as dynamics, by
where we emphasize the dependence of these processes on the decision variables . We will use similar notation to emphasize the dependence of each of the components of n on , as, for example, Q n . Now we come to the game theoretic setting. It is described for fixed n. In the game, the dynamics described above will serve as the game's state. The game is played by the customers to arrive up to timeT , whereT ∈ 0 is fixed throughout. A decision is made by each customer once the queue length of the corresponding class at the time of arrival is revealed to it. Thus for our purpose, a strategy is a mapping + → 0 1 . We denote the set of all such mappings by . A strategy profile is an element of¯ = 1 2 N × . Let a strategy profile = ij ∈¯ be given. We say that the game is played with the strategy profile if one has 
Thus
n is the dynamics resulting from having each customer i j adopt the strategy ij , and n i j is a r.v. representing the action taken by customer i j in that situation. An argument by induction on the times of arrival shows that the system of Equations (19) has a unique solution, and thus n and n are well-defined r.v.s. We will also need a notation for the dynamics n , thus determined by (19), as a function of the strategy profile . We write it as n . We formulate the payoff for customer i j by accounting for a cost associated with not receiving service (in case of reneging) and a function of the waiting time (in case of joining). To this end, we are given constants r i > 0, i ∈ 1 2 N and functions h i + → + , assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing, and to vanish at zero. For a strategy profile = ij , denote ij = k l k l = i j . The payoff for customer i j , when the strategy profile is played, is given by
Thus, according to the payoff definition, the game neglects all customers arriving after timeT . Note that if we let h (20) can be written in terms of the unnormalized waiting time as h n i WT n ij . Thus, for example, when h i are linear, and given by h i x = c i x, x ≥ 0, our setting corresponds to assuming that a class-i customer incurs a holding cost of c i √ n per unit time. For fixed n and > 0, and an event˜ ∈ , a strategy profile = ij is said to be an -Nash equilibrium on the event˜ if
holds on˜ . A sequence of strategy profiles n n∈ is said to be an -Nash equilibrium w.h.p., if there exist events˜ n , n ∈ , such that, for every n, n is an -Nash equilibrium onˆ n , and ˜ n → 1 as n → . For each n and i j , consider the strategy
Theorem 2.1. For any > 0, under each of the two scheduling policies defined above, the sequence of strategy profiles n defined in (22) is an -Nash equilibrium w.h.p.
Remark 2.2 (Relation to Naor's Result).
The decision threshold expressed by (22) is closely related to that from Naor's celebrated result (Naor [16] ; see also Hassin and Haviv [13] , Section 2.1), that addresses an expected delay cost, and a nonasymptotic regime. One can, in fact, recover Naor's threshold from (22). To this end, consider Theorem 2.1 in the case of a single class (N = 1), and assume that h x = cx, x ≥ 0. This assumption corresponds to a cost c n = c √ n per unit time incurred by a customer who decides to join. By (22), using the heavy traffic condition = , the customer joins if and only if c Q n t / √ n ≤ r, namely, Q n t ≤ rn /c n . Since n is asymptotic to n , the above threshold is asymptotic to r n /c n , which gives Naor's threshold (cf. with Hassin and Haviv [13, Equation (2.1)]). , which correspond to the actual (unnormalized) waiting times, we see that the ratio q/ n i is required to be computed in order to make the decision. In particular, customers need access to the current state of the system, namely, the queue length, and the system parameters, specifically n i . In practical applications, this means that the system manager should provide information on the rate of arrival. Since the rate of arrival, n i , is only needed up to a first order approximation, n i , it seems natural to achieve such an approximation by counting recent arrivals over an interval of time, in applications where such a procedure is feasible. The interval should be sufficiently long for the law of large numbers to yield effective estimates. An interesting open question that arises from this discussion is whether one could obtain results similar to ours when system parameters such as i and i are not available to the decision makers.
Remark 2.4 (RSP Does Not Always Hold).
One of the main issues we address is the validity of RSP under the scheduling policies considered. To prove the main result, this principle needs to hold in a strong form, namely, that, w.h.p., every customer arriving, and joining, in the given time interval 0 T , experiences a delay given, with high precision, by the ratio between queue length and arrival rate. for arbitrary scheduling. For example, consider a scheduling that prioritizes class 1 over class 2 up to a certain fixed time, t 0 , and then switches to the a priority of 2 over 1. The standard prediction is that the diffusion scale waiting time for a class-i customer is approximately given by WT ≈ −1
i , whereQ i is the diffusion scale queue length at the arrival time. Now, consider a class-2 customer present in the buffer at time t 0 . Such a customer will be sent to service approximately 1 1 + 2 2 −1q units of time after t 0 , whereq = n −1/2 q, and q is its position in line at t 0 , because when 2 has priority, every server in the pool to become available will pick a customer from buffer 2. Hence, w.h.p., most customers that are in buffer 2 at time t 0 , that are, in fact, O √ n in number, will experience a delay significantly different than that predicted by RSP. This number increases even further under a policy that switches priority many times during the time interval in question. While these policies may not be particularly interesting by their own right, this discussion shows that there is content in the assertion that the principle does hold for the policies of interest.
Remark 2.5 (Individual Decisions May Have Long Term Effect).
The analysis must take into account the possible behaviour of customers that do not follow the proposed rule. At the technical level, the estimates that lead to existence of diffusion limits are dealt with for different behaviours of customers. It may seem that it is enough to consider the behavior of the system when all customers follow the proposed rule, and then argue that the behaviour of a single customer will have a negligible effect. It should be noted, however, that the decision of one customer may significantly affect the waiting time of other customers. As a simple example for that, consider a two-class system under FP, where, at a certain time, a high-priority customer arrives to find an empty buffer of its own class. If he decides to leave, and for a little while there are no new arrivals, then the first-in-line customer at the low-priority class will get served as soon as a server becomes available. If he joins, it is possible that a large number of high-priority customers will join soon after, so that the waiting time of the low-priority customer referred to above will delay considerably. Hence a single player's decision may have a significant effect on other players.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is based on analysis at the diffusion scale. On the way to proving it, we obtain diffusion limit results for the two policies under consideration, namely, Proposition 3.3 for FP, and Proposition 4.3 for SLQ. . We begin by noting that in order to show that n is an -Nash equilibrium w.h.p., it suffices to consider (21) with =¯ n ij only. Indeed, given i j and ∈ , define A = q ∈ + : q = n ij q . Then we have
and so the validity of (21) for =¯ n ij and = n ij (the latter being trivial) implies the validity of this inequality for ∈ . We will use the term scenario for the collection of processes obtained under any one of the strategy profiles ¯ n ij n ij . More precisely, let us fix n. Recall that, for ∈¯ , n denotes the dynamics obtained when a strategy profile is played. Let = i j i ∈ 1 2 N j ∈ For s = i j ∈ , the scenario s is defined to be n ¯ n ij n ij , namely, the dynamics corresponding to player i j playing¯ n ij and all other players k l playing n kl . In addition, scenario 0, that we will also call the reference scenario, is defined as n n . Scenarios are thus indexed by the set 0 = ∪ 0 . As we have just argued, the main result will follow once we show that there exist events˜ n such that, for every n, on˜ n ,
and ˜ n → 1 as n → . We thus work in what follows with scenarios. To address all scenarios simultaneously, the dependence of the processes on the scenario has to be reflected in the notation. For each of the processes introduced above, except for the stochastic primitives and their scaled versions, an additional superscript s will indicate that the process is considered under scenario s ∈ 0 . Thus, for example, Q n s = Q n ¯ 
Throughout what follows, we adopt the convention that e n s t (or sometimes e n s i t ), t ∈ 0 T , denotes a generic family of processes, indexed by n ∈ and s ∈ 0 , that can change from one appearance to another, and has the property sup s e n s T → 0 in probability, as n → .
The balance Equations (6)- (8) 
Then by the assumptions on the initial conditions we havê
Our first estimate addresses the scaled queue lengths of the high-priority classes. Proof. From the functional central limit theorem we have,
where W 1 and W 2 are independent N -dimensional BMs, with W 1 a 0 A 1 -BM and W 2 a 0 A 2 -BM,
, and A 2 = diag i (see Billingsley [7, Section 17] ). In particular, the sequence Ê n Ŝ n is C-tight. 
Throughout, for 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 < , I = t 1 t 2 and f + → , we use the notation 
By (29) and (9), 1 · n s t = n for t = 
where the last equality uses the fact that N i=1 n s i = n that is true thanks to the nonidling condition (9) and the fact that, by (29), the queues are not all empty. Therefore for small enough there exists a > 0, such that 
Let r n > 0 be a sequence such that r n → 0 and √ nr n → . If
where K is a constant and, throughout, for f + → k (k a positive integer),
On the other hand, if
Hence by (28) and the resulting C-tightness ofÊ 
Therefore by the tightness of Ê n i T and Ŝ n i T , n ∈ (for T fixed), we have
Putting together the estimates (31) and (32), we obtain s A n s c → 1. Since > 0 is arbitrary, the result follows.
and note that these constants are positive. By (22), under the reference scenario, class-i customers always renege when the scaled queue lengthQ n i is in the interval i i + 1/ √ n and therefore the scaled queue length never exceeds that bound. Under any other scenario, there is at most one customer that does not follow the rule (22), and so we haveQ
Conversely, a class-i reneging will never take place when h i Q n s i / i < r i , except, possibly, by a single customer. (ii) We begin by proving the result for the high-priority classes. Thus, fix i ≤ N − 1. We have by (6),
By the functional law of large numbers, sup 0≤t≤T Ē n i t − i t → 0 in probability. Hence the estimates of Lemma 3.1 give (recall the convention (24))B n s i t = i t + e n s t (37) Next, by (7) and (8) Also, on the event n s ∩ n < /16 ,
Thus on I n s we have
n s i t ≤ 1 − /16 < 1, which implies by the nonidling assumption that, on this time interval, we have N n=1 Q n s i t = 0. As a result, on this time interval there is no reneging under the reference scenario, and there is at most one reneging under any other scenario. Recalling that X n s = Q n s + n s , and using (6) and (7), we obtain, for a given scenario s, on the event 
By the tightness of Ê n N T and Ŝ n N T for n ∈ (and T fixed) and the fact that 
and reflects on the boundary of G in the direction −e N . Let W t be a ˆ A -BM, where
Let X L be the unique pair of processes that is adapted to the filtration X 0 ∨ W u u ≤ t , where X has sample paths in G , L has nondecreasing sample paths in + , and the pair satisfies a.s., The existence and uniqueness of such a pair follows from Proposition 3 of Anderson and Orey [3] on noting that b is Lipschitz. We call this pair the solution to the SDE (39).
Define
The following two properties follow directly from the definition, namely, there exists a constant C such that
and
Given z ∈ N , z 0 ∈ G, we say that y ∈ N × solves the Skorohod problem (SP) in G, with reflection in the direction −e N , for data z, if y t ∈ G for all t, is nonnegative and nondecreasing, and
It is well known that for z as above, a necessary and sufficient condition for y to be a solution is that y = z (this follows, e.g., as a special case of the much broader result of Dupuis and Ishii [8] ). This will be used in the proof below. DenoteŴ
Recall conditions C1-C2 from Section 1 that characterize C-tightness. We will say that a sequence of processes n s , n ∈ , s ∈ 0 , with sample paths in k , is C-tight, uniformly in s if C1 . The sequence of random variables n s T is tight for every fixed T < , and C2 . For every T < , > 0, and > 0 there exist n 0 and > 0 such that n ≥ n 0 implies sup
, where X L form the solution to the SDE (39), and
Proof. The C-tightness ofŴ n s , uniformly in s, follows from (43) using (28) and the fact that¯
and, noting that by (9) one has 1 ·Q n s = 1 ·X n s + , 
by (34). Thus
and, as follows from (38), (44), and (45),
Under the reference scenario, no class-N reneging occurs whenQ n 0 < N , that is,
As a result, the same is true withQ 
The convergence ofX n 0 , the uniform C-tightness ofŴ n s , the Lipschitz property of b and the Lipschitz property of , as expressed by (41), imply tightness of the r.v.s sup s Ỹ n s T , upon an application of Gronwall's lemma to (53). Hence, using again (53), along with the property (42), shows that the processesỸ n s are C-tight, uniformly in s. As a result,R n s N are also C-tight, uniformly in s. By Equations (52)-(54), any subsequential weak limit of Ŵ n 0 Ỹ n 0 R n 0 N must be equal in distribution to W X L . As a result,
From the definition ofỸ n s and Lemma 3.1 it follows thatX n s =Ỹ n s + e n s . Moreover, since by Lemma 3.2, R n s i = e n s for i ≤ N − 1, we have Ŵ n 0 X n 0 R n 0 ⇒ W X Le N . Finally, the factQ 4. Serve the longest queue. In this section we carry out our analysis under the SLQ scheduling. The crucial property in this case is the state space collapse exhibited by the queue length processes. Recall the constants i from (33), that determine the upper limit on the value attained byQ n s i . While in the previous section the threshold of the least priority class, N , was significant, under the current service policy, the property that queue lengths remain equal makes the minimal threshold important. Thus, assume that the classes are labelled in such a way that 1 Note that 1 ·X n s = 1 ·Q n s , hence, on the time interval I n s 1 , the ith queue length is less than the average. Since the scheduling policy always chooses the longest queue and on this time interval, no customer from class i enters service. Therefore the class-i queue length can only increase during this period. Thus we have
Hence N −1 j =iQ n s j ≥ /2, and so by the balance equation for Q n s , (6), 
Thus, for t ∈ 0 T ,
And so by Gronwall's lemma we have 
Using the convergence ofÊ n andŜ n (28) and that of the initial condition (18) → 0. We have thus shown that A n → 0. The conclusion of item (i) now follows on using again the fact that min jQ n s j ≥ N −1 1 ·Q n s − implies max jQ n s j ≤ N −1 1 ·Q n s + N . As for item (ii), recall that N < i for all i < M = N . Hence the assertion is a direct consequence of (34) and item (i).
Next, consider M ∈ 1 2 N . Fix a sequence k n , n ∈ , such that lim n −1/2 k n = and lim n −1 k n = 0. Given T < , define
We use the notation U * n s = U n s · ∧ T n s for any process U n s , and refer to these processes as stopped versions of the original processes. The following result states that Lemma 4.1 is valid for the stopped processes. T → 0, in probability, as n → .
Proof. Note that, by definition,R * n s = e n s . Hence a use of (58) and again Gronwall's lemma immediately give¯ * n s = + e n s , proving the second part of item (i) on the lemma. With this at hand, the remaining assertions are proved as in Lemma 4.1.
In the case where M = N , we provide a convergence result. We do not attempt such an analysis for M < N , where, as is shown in a work in progress (Atar and Saha [4] ), the limiting behaviour may depend on properties that are finer than first and second order data. Thus, for M < N , we only obtain C-tightness of the processes, that however will suffice for the purpose of proving the main result.
To present the result regarding the case M = N , we consider an SDE of the form (39) with different domain G and drift b. Namely, we consider
The process W t is as in Section 3, and the SDE of interest is now X t = X 0 + W t + (i) For general M, the processesŴ n s ,X n s ,R n s ,Q n s andˆ n s are C-tight, uniformly in s. (ii) In the case M = N , as n → , Ŵ n 0 X n 0 R n 0 Q n 0 ˆ n 0 converges in distribution to W X Le N Q , where X L form the solution to the SDE (61), and
Step 1. In this and the next step we consider the case M = N . We havê 
The completion of the proof, based on the above, is precisely as in Proposition 3.3.
Step 3. It remains to prove (i) for M < N . We start by arguing that conclusions analogous to those obtained in Step 1 are valid here too, but for the stopped processes. Indeed, working as in Step It follows that * n s is given by * n s t = sup 0≤u≤t N N − * n s u + e n s u
